How might China "invade" Taiwan?

In case you are wondering why a blog called "Singapore 2B" seems to be (overly) concerned with issues of China and her commitment to "reclaim"/reunite Taiwan, it is because China is a major player in the region, the top trading partner with Singapore (in 2020), and Taiwan is similar to Singapore in many ways.

Some of the vulnerabilities of Taiwan are also Singapore's vulnerabilities, and there may be lessons for Singapore. Or cautionary tales.

I have previously declared (in another blogpost):

If you got the impression... that China is unlikely to invade Taiwan (at least in the foreseeable future - say within the next 6 years) that was the most important point. I wanted to discount the probability of an invasion, at least in the foreseeable future. Base on the current balance of power and advantages and disadvantages, it is on balance better for China NOT to attempt to retake Taiwan, because it is likely to fail.

However, a core principle or truism in military strategy is, you do not PLAN for what the opponent SHOULD, or is LIKELY to do, but what he CAN do. China CAN decide to try to invade Taiwan. On balance, China should not as success is unlikely, and the fallout would be devastating, so China SHOULD NOT TRY to invade Taiwan. 

But she could.

And plans have to be made as if she would. 

BUT...

Okay, the argument is that China would not try to invade Taiwan in the near future. From the same blogpost:

For domestic political reasons, China is extremely unlikely to embark on a war of choice against Taiwan in the next year. In February 2022 Beijing will have the opportunity to present itself in the best possible light to a massive international audience when it hosts the Winter Olympics, in which the Chinese government has invested lavishly. A cross-strait war would ruin this party. In October 2022, the CCP will hold its 20th National Party Congress. Xi Jinping will be up for a third term as CCP general secretary. It is hard to imagine Xi starting an unnecessary war with Taiwan prior to his re-appointment because of the high risk that war-related economic and even political turmoil would erode Xi’s popularity.

So, it is unlikely, for the 2022 Winter Olympics and the 20th National Party Congress, for China to pro-actively start a war or invasion of Taiwan. Before or in 2022. 

But, the ongoing campaign of harassment and provocation of Taiwan, is intended in part to trigger a strong, military reaction from Taiwan which would give China the moral high ground to retaliate. (The main intent is to rattle Taiwan and "punish" the pro-independence government. But, a side effect of an over-reacting Taiwan would also serve China/Xi Jinping's purpose.)

And once Xi Jinping has secured his third term as General Secretary of the CCP, he would be free to pursue reunification with Taiwan.

IF China were to initiate military actions against Taiwan, how might she do so?

The two major logistical challenges are 1) the Taiwan straits is not conducive to amphibious assault ten months out of the year, and 2) China lacks the amphibious vehicles/transports necessary for a mass landing of troops.

So a mass amphibious troop landing after crossing the turbulent Taiwan strait is not likely. Or not likely to succeed with the current military assets (LST, Amphibious crafts, etc). And failure would be a loss of face for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

What could China do?

Take the smaller islands. 

Taiwan has several small islands that are nearer to China - Matsu Islands (off the coast of Fuzhou about 20 km or less), and Kinmen Island (off Xiamen less than 10 km) are the closest. They are within artillery range of the mainland, and too far for Taiwan to effectively defend.

Moreover, the Kinmen people are quite independent and might not have as much affinity for "independent" Taiwan (most of the time they vote for the KMT). As such, mainland "invaders" may not be very much resisted. 

The PLA could easily take Kinmen Islands without too much trouble - no rough seas to travel (or less than 10 km), and well within artillery range. And it would be up to Taiwan to respond.

Taiwan will have to weigh the cost of trying to defend Kinmen, or (if they fail) re-take Kinmen. They would have to enter the lion's den to try to defend/snatch the island from the PLA. And the PLA can array their might against the Taiwanese airforce and navy. Taiwan would be hard pressed to bring to bear sufficient resources, or would be disadvantaged by the distance Kinmen is from Taiwan's main island, and its proximity to mainland China. And even if they could retake Kinmen, how long could they hold it?

So logically, Taiwan should just try to impotently attempt diplomacy and use diplomatic language and international pressure to try to get China to relinquish Kinmen. But it would be futile. Because international pressure (tends to) roll off the back of China like water off a duck.

In the 60s, the US had said that Kinmen (also known as Quemoy) was absolutely necessary to be retained as a bastion of freedom. Now a military foray would also test US resolve - would they commit to war with China over an insignificant island (Kinmen has no oil)?

I do not think so. The US might well provide Taiwan more defense equipment and assets, but decide to let Taiwan sort out its military problems.

China's diplomatic pretext, as if it needed one, would be that Kinmen and all of Taiwan was part of China, and China has always committed to reunification. And besides, the people of Kinmen WANT to be part of China (this could be true, or it could just be spin). 

And this would be phase one of the reunification of Taiwan. And if China can successfully take and hold Kinmen, it would be an achievement in the "Success" column.

After things have settled and it is clear that Taiwan is not going to try to retake Kinmen, China could then take the Matsu islands. 

China could try two alternative tactics. 

One is to feign focus and attention on Kinmen - redeveloping the island, beefing up its defences, and making it harder for Taiwan to retake the island. 

Then in a surprise move, take the Matsu islands one by one . 

Alternatively, China could put Taiwan on notice that their next target was to take the Matsu islands (there are about 36 of them). Civilians may flee the islands in the face of such threats. Those that stay may well be sympathetic to China/the CCP.

The people of the Matsu islands have usually elected KMT into public office. So it would suggest that quite a few of them are sympathetic to the PRC. 

The islands are garrisoned by ROC troops, but they would be hard pressed to resist a concerted invasion by the PLA. If they are to defend the islands successfully, they would need to be reinforced. Considerably.

But Taiwan would be foolish to expend their limited resources to defend the indefensible. You do not want to put all or a lot of your eggs in one fragile basket.

So China might well take Matsu Islands as well. 

The point is not about taking Kinmen and Matsu with a view to eventually taking Taiwan. The point is simply to save face.

Taiwan is dug in. Trying to take Taiwan main island would be an exercise in sacrifice. HUGE sacrifice of man and equipment. The island is well defended. And success is not guaranteed. If the military adventure is seen as a failure or ill-advised, Xi Jinping would be seen as ineffective, and a poor leader.

The Art of War is to goad your enemy into attacking you where you are strong. 

Taiwan would be foolish to try to retake two islands they have little hope or retaking, and even if they are able to do the impossible and retake the islands, it would be at a considerable cost that would probably deplete their defences of the main island.

It would be a pyrrhic victory at best. Winning the battle but losing the war.

Taiwan might well have to face the reality, that they have no hope of forcibly retaking those islands, if China were to make their move on them. 

These islands are largely indefensible.

After one or two wins (Kinmen and Matsu), Xi's need for affirmation may be (temporarily) satisfied.

This video (below) suggests another possible target for China - the Pratas Island 450 km from Taiwan but lightly defended (at about 3:15 in the video) with about 200 Taiwanese troops. China has been surveilling the island, perhaps with the intent of forcibly taking it. 

Dongsha or Pratas Island would be more easily invaded, as it has no permanent inhabitants compared to Kinmen or Matsu Islands. So there would not be a question of a local rebellion or resistance to a PRC takeover. 

And China could then militarised the island for strategic purposes.

Taking small far-flung islands (from the main Taiwan island) are just low hanging fruits. Xi might use Taiwanese over-reaction as a pretext to do so. The constant harassment and provocations would indicate that the CCP or PLA is prepared to do so at any moment. Taking these small island may be sufficient to prove Xi's military competence, distract the Chinese public from domestic woes, and silence Xi's critics.

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The video below is 26 mins long and looks at how Taiwanese see themselves and their affinity (or lack of) to China. This speaks to the improbability that Taiwan would voluntarily and peacefully reunite with China. 

At 13:55, the video highlights the vulnerability of the Matsu Islands, just 9 km from China, and how China encroaches on Matsu Island's territory as a "grey zone" tactic to harass, intimidate, and provoke Taiwan. 

If Taiwan reacts militarily (or over-reacts), it might give China the pretext to escalate to military action, and say, invade Matsu.

 

Would China invade in the next 5 years?

In the short term (say for 2022), China is unlikely to initiate anything for reasons stated at the start of this blogpiece - The Winter Olympics, and the Xi's bid for a third term.

After that however, what is there to stop China from carving out Kinmen, Matsu, or Dongsha?

International standing.

China is being restrained (I think) by their need for international respect, and to save face. China has consistently claimed a pacifist role -- that they have never instigated conquest. So their preferred scenario is to respond to aggression and overt provocation, rather than to be seen as the provocateurs in a shooting war.

[Addendum: this video expands on the previous video (above) on the issue of sand dredging around Matsu, which is provocative, and presents Taiwan with a dilemma.

If Taiwan responds too aggressively, China could use that as a pretext to respond militarily.]

This would allow them to frame themselves as the "victim", or acting in self-defence and so take the moral high ground and perhaps this might stay the hand of the US military. It is okay for the US military to come to the aid of Taiwan, but should the US help Taiwan's aggression?

China may be hoping that such nuanced consideration may stop the US from intervening or at least confuse the issue sufficiently to at least delay US intervention at the start of hostilities.

China may also be constrained by trade, specifically with Taiwan. Taiwan is a leading producer of bleeding edge chips. And China needs access to those chips for their smart phones, and other high tech devices. 

But there are also suggestions that Xi's position is not as secure. That he is not able to lead China to a victory over Taiwan. If Xi is also seen as being unable to deal with China's economic and other domestic problems, he could also "do a Galtieri" and invade Taiwan to distract or divert attention from his failings.

[Sidenote: The Peng Shuai incident, according to some political analyst may have elements of political machinations. Xi Jinping has been "purging" the upper echelons of the CCP of the Jiang Zemin/Hu Jintao faction with his anti-corruption campaign. Zhang Gaoli, as the former vice-Premier was in the Jiang/Hu camp. He rose up under their shadow (and munificence). A scandal involving Zhang, might also tarnish the Jiang/Hu faction and possibly weaken their influence. ]