In a recent discussion on Singapore's political system, some opposition parties suggested scrapping the GRC (and presumably, first-past-the-post) voting to have Proportional Representation System (PRS).
There is a series of videos on political systems - how to choose a government - on YouTube, by CGP Grey.
First, you should watch the video on The Problems with First Past the Post voting.
This is a 6 1/2 minute video covering the problems with one person one vote, and first-past-the-post rules.
The initial scenario with 7 candidates is similar to the SG 2011 Presidential Election, with the winning candidate, getting less than 50% of the votes.
At 1:40, the video covers why eventually, all such First-past-the-post system will end up with a two party system (like in the US), and (by implication) why most voters don't bother to vote by then (in the US, voter turn out for the Presidential Elections is about 50% or less in some years).
Showing posts with label NCMP. Show all posts
Showing posts with label NCMP. Show all posts
Thursday, 25 February 2016
Why not Proportional Representation?
Tuesday, 26 April 2011
Why the PAP should grant full voting rights to NCMP
The govt should make amendments to the constitution to grant Non-Constituency Members of Parliament, full rights to vote on Constitutional Amendments, Supply Bills, and No-Confidence votes against the ruling government.
The WP have been attacking the NCMP scheme as not true opposition, because they don't have the full rights of the MP.
Well, give them full rights. Even the right to move for a no-confidence vote against the ruling party.
With at least 1 NCMP in parliament, you know that there won't be more than 9 opposition MPs and NCMPs in total. That is how the NCMP scheme works. If there are fewer than 9 opposition, NCMP can make up the numbers up to 9. But if there are more than 9 opposition, the NCMP scheme will not apply.
That means should a constitutional amendment or supply bill comes up for voting, the 9 NCMP (the max number of NCMP) will not be enough to block the bill anyway.
So give the opposition what it wants. It will cost the PAP nothing.
And if the opposition now says, "of course the PAP gave us this concession, it is meaningless!", the PAP can then point out how the opposition have been focusing on pointless battles without considering the practical effects or outcomes of their pursuits. If they can't see the simple consequences of what is a relatively straightforward matter, what more can they predict the consequences of whatever else they are proposing.
The WP have been attacking the NCMP scheme as not true opposition, because they don't have the full rights of the MP.
Well, give them full rights. Even the right to move for a no-confidence vote against the ruling party.
With at least 1 NCMP in parliament, you know that there won't be more than 9 opposition MPs and NCMPs in total. That is how the NCMP scheme works. If there are fewer than 9 opposition, NCMP can make up the numbers up to 9. But if there are more than 9 opposition, the NCMP scheme will not apply.
That means should a constitutional amendment or supply bill comes up for voting, the 9 NCMP (the max number of NCMP) will not be enough to block the bill anyway.
So give the opposition what it wants. It will cost the PAP nothing.
And if the opposition now says, "of course the PAP gave us this concession, it is meaningless!", the PAP can then point out how the opposition have been focusing on pointless battles without considering the practical effects or outcomes of their pursuits. If they can't see the simple consequences of what is a relatively straightforward matter, what more can they predict the consequences of whatever else they are proposing.
Monday, 11 April 2011
NCMP: The flip side of the GRC
This blog is still under construction. Please excuse the mess.
In my previous post, I explained why the GRC is needed. Now, let's see how it might be unfair.
The GRC system provides the ruling party with an advantage. They can let an untested candidate ride on the coat-tails of politically established MP and coast into parliament, untried, untested, unstressed.
In contrast, at this stage of the oppositions' development, candidates have to fight and win every vote themselves.
But consider: If the opposition does the insurmountable and win a GRC, they become the incumbents and unless they screw up badly, they have the incumbents' advantage in the next election. Look at how long Chiam and Low held their respective wards once they won them. Of course, there were also one-hit wonders like Ling and Cheo.
So the GRC advantage is not a ruling party advantage, but an incumbent's advantage. In the next election, an opposition-held GRC can retire one MP (or more) and bring in a fresh face. Of course the incumbent's advantage is only an advantage if the team perform well or well enough.
But, the task of winning a GRC in the first place is not easy, so for now, the deck seems to be stacked against the opposition.
Now this could have stayed this way, but in all fairness, the PAP offered a side door to the opposition, even as they used the GRC to close many doors to them.
The Non-Constituency Member of Parliament or NCMP scheme is unique to Singapore. This scheme allows the best opposition losers (if there are less than 9 elected opposition MPs) to enter parliament as NCMP (now up to 9 NCMP and opposition MP in total).
So an opposition that does very well but still doesn't win all the votes necessary to repesent the constituency, can still slip into parliament on the NCMP ticket. This is the flip side to the GRC system.
So untried, untested, but promising opposition candidates can make it into parliament where they can show their ability, and if they are good enough, they could parley their credible performance in parliament to win a seat in the next election.
That's a pretty good deal for the opposition.
In my previous post, I explained why the GRC is needed. Now, let's see how it might be unfair.
The GRC system provides the ruling party with an advantage. They can let an untested candidate ride on the coat-tails of politically established MP and coast into parliament, untried, untested, unstressed.
In contrast, at this stage of the oppositions' development, candidates have to fight and win every vote themselves.
But consider: If the opposition does the insurmountable and win a GRC, they become the incumbents and unless they screw up badly, they have the incumbents' advantage in the next election. Look at how long Chiam and Low held their respective wards once they won them. Of course, there were also one-hit wonders like Ling and Cheo.
So the GRC advantage is not a ruling party advantage, but an incumbent's advantage. In the next election, an opposition-held GRC can retire one MP (or more) and bring in a fresh face. Of course the incumbent's advantage is only an advantage if the team perform well or well enough.
But, the task of winning a GRC in the first place is not easy, so for now, the deck seems to be stacked against the opposition.
Now this could have stayed this way, but in all fairness, the PAP offered a side door to the opposition, even as they used the GRC to close many doors to them.
The Non-Constituency Member of Parliament or NCMP scheme is unique to Singapore. This scheme allows the best opposition losers (if there are less than 9 elected opposition MPs) to enter parliament as NCMP (now up to 9 NCMP and opposition MP in total).
So an opposition that does very well but still doesn't win all the votes necessary to repesent the constituency, can still slip into parliament on the NCMP ticket. This is the flip side to the GRC system.
So untried, untested, but promising opposition candidates can make it into parliament where they can show their ability, and if they are good enough, they could parley their credible performance in parliament to win a seat in the next election.
That's a pretty good deal for the opposition.
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