The Russo-Ukraine War and the (Cautionary) Lessons for China

This video below is a panel discussion on how China is reacting to and learning from the Russo-Ukraine War.

The video starts with the question: Is China ok with this war?

One naive view is that they are. That China has Russia's back, and this is fine with China. 

Except that it should not.

In one ill-advised, irrational move, Putin has up-ended the world order. 

Over the last 30 years or so, China has benefited from this orderly world and prospered and grown and now they are on the cusp of dethroning the US, if they have not already. 

And Europe's relationship with the US was rocky after the Trump Presidency. UK Brexited the European Union. Germany and France was drifting away from the US, and US hegemony or leadership was on shaky grounds. 

Then, Putin in one idiotic move, has done what no one had managed to do: unite Europe and driven Europe and the US back together, and disrupted the orderly world that China was about to dominate.

This is not what China wants!

Well, initially, China was hoping that the war in Europe would distract and divert the attention of the US away from the Pacific and the South China Sea, but the cohesive and coherent response of Europe and the world has allowed the US to continue to keep one eye on the Asia-Pacific (to China's chagrin).

China was also hoping to learn lessons from a quick invasion and conquest of Ukraine, lessons that China could apply when it moves to "reunite" Taiwan. But the invasion of Ukraine has not gone according to plan or to schedule. And Putin has been thwarted and embarrassed. And at this point (17/3/2022), his chances of military success is slim to none.

Well, China can take some lessons from Russia's (and Putin's) mistakes. While you should learn from your mistakes, it is less costly to learn from other's mistakes.

Military Lessons

First, logistic support. You can have the best tanks, you can have a lot of tanks, but if you can't get fuel for the tanks, the tanks are just sitting in a row and make for target practice for your opponent. 

Second, Air Supremacy. The Russian Air Force is conspicuous by their absence. The plan was for Russia to have complete air supremacy over Ukraine within 72 hours (or less). They did not achieve that. 

Third, SEAD - Suppression of Enemy Air Defences. Russia failed to carry out SEAD. As a result, the air over Ukraine remains contested, and so the Russian air force are forced to fly low to avoid air defences, which leave them vulnerable to ManPADs - Man Portable Air Defence systems like the Stinger missile.

There are other lessons that are subsets of those three main lessons. How machines were ill-maintained and broke down due to failure of critical parts not maintained properly. Poor quality tyres for example. How pilots have only the bare minimum of training and how they lack confidence to either use the high tech machines, or were unable to exploit the full capabilities of their machines. Poor morale, poor training, strategic mistakes by the Russian forces all are lessons for China. 

Of course China could dismiss those lessons as irrelevant to China and her long-stated goal of reunification of Taiwan, by force if necessary.

Sanctions, and the lessons for China 

The imposition of sanctions against Russia, turning it into the pariah of the world is also a cautionary take-away for China. The crash of the Ruble, freezing of foreign assets, and all the other pressure points brought to bear upon Russia has been brutal to the Russian economy. Putin is no fool and had expected sanctions and costs, and in preparation, the Central Bank of Russia had stockpiled a $630 billion war chest in reserves. Putin/Russia had expected to be able to draw on this reserves during the war. However, the Western Allies have frozen Russia's foreign reserves and now less than 50% of their reserves (one estimate put the reserves available at just over $200 billion) is available. And the Central Bank of Russia is quickly running out of options.

More importantly, the sanctions are crippling Russia's economy by cutting off their access to technology.

As one comic commented, Putin wanted the old Soviet Union back. With the sanctions, Putin is getting his wish though not as he had expected. Russia is returning to the shortages and inefficiencies of the old Soviet Union. 

China can expect the same too, if they try to reclaim Taiwan.

Of course, China believes that the world MUST see the issue of reunification of Taiwan as China's domestic issue of reclaiming a "rogue province". 

China would "expect" that China's near universal recognition as the "One China" by most nations in the world, compared to Taiwan's miserable recognition by a mere 15 nations (including the Vatican City) to mean that (most of) the world will see China's reunification of Taiwan by force (if necessary) to be an internal domestic issue, and not the same as Putin's unprovoked invasion of an independent sovereign country. 

Of course that is based on China's assumption (or hope) that the world's near universal support was not a concession of convenience for the opportunity to access the 1.4 billion Chinese market that the capitalistic western economies were eyeing. That the recognition of China (as in PRC) was based on principles and not pecuniary interests. Otherwise, those recognition will mean little.

China believes (or hopes) that the "Western Democracies" will NOT see it as an autocratic state invading a democratic nation. But the Western Democracies are fickle and often pursue their own agenda and may choose to see things according to their warped perception, and not as it should be. Or from China's perspective.

China can "expect" a "walk over" in Taiwan, just as Putin had expected his forces to stroll into Ukraine and be welcomed with open arms. If Russia's experience has any lesson, it is this: What you expect and what you get are two different things.

China might expect, prudently, that there would be sanctions, as Russia had experienced. China could HOPE that the sanctions would not be so unanimous or so thorough, or so devastating to China's economy. But of course, hope is not a strategy. When China unilaterally boycotted Australian coal (because Australia was being disrespectful to China), it backfired on China - power outages, factories closure, coal price increase, worries about winter heating. So even if sanctions were not as extensive as for Russia, what privations can China expect?

[Afternote: China is now part of the system. It is Communist in government, but Capitalism is the basis of its economy (mostly), and it is integrated into the mesh of global trade, more so than Russia. As such, it would be harder to sanction China without hurting the sanctioning countries... but the Russo-Ukraine war has shown that countries are willing to endure suffering to contain and constraint Russia. Would these Western Democracies have the same appetite for suffering to contain China? When China is more integrated and the pain might be more extensive? We shall see.]

China has tried to walk the middle ground and not offend Putin who is an ally and a friend, while at the same time not upset the majority of the world. However, this does not help Putin, and is not in China's interest. 

China hoped that the Russo-Ukraine war would pull the focus of the world, particularly the US and the western democracies, and so have less attention to spare on China and the Asia Pacific. However, this would require Russia to win the war, and there is some doubt as to whether that is now (as at 17/3/2022) achievable. 

In an "open report" to the Chinese government, Hu Wei, an public policy think-tank Chairman, provided his objective assessment of the Russo-Ukraine conflict and the likely outcome at this point and his recommendation for China's flexible response to get the best outcome for China. Hu calls the Putin's military action "an irreversible mistake". Putin is unlikely to prevail, and even if a costly victory is wrestled out of it, it would be a pyrrhic victory at best. He expects that Putin would eventually be ousted, Russia to be weakened and diminished, and if China were to be coupled to Putin, China would also be diminished. 

His advice to China is to sever ties with Putin. In international diplomacy, there are no permanent friends, only permanent interests. He estimates that China has a window of a week or two to act decisively. Or China would be tied to Putin's fate. 

At about the same time, a US advisor was not particularly optimistic for a negotiated peace in the Russo-Ukraine War. Currently, Ukrainian President Zelenskyy is highly motivated to a negotiated peace. However, Putin is "more interest in making a point than in making a deal" and as such does not appear to be motivated to talk peace. 

There are two possible ways to pressure him to the negotiation table. One is pressure from below - a grassroot pressure from the suffering Russian people. However, Putin is not likely to respond to such pressure. The other source would be pressure from the side - from a friend or an ally. China is best positioned for this. 

However, in his estimation, China does not have any reason to push Putin to negotiate for peace. China may well find it suits China to have the West pre-occupied with this conflict. 

But the Hu essay would suggest that China does have an interest in appearing to be a peacemaker. 

[Afternote: But China is committed to her partnership with Russia, because there are no other "friend" as strong and as opposed to US hegemony, than Russia. That is China's Dilemma.]